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Abstract – With the developing of the attack and defense technology, the cyber environment 
has been more and more sophisticated. We failed to give an accurate evaluation of network 
security situation, as we lack a more accurate quantitative evaluation of attack-defense 
behaviors. In response to this situation, we proposed an attack-defense stochastic game 
model (ADSGM), analyzed the different security property of distinct defense mechanism, and 
put forward a corresponding utility calculation coping with the distinct defense mechanism. 
Through a case study, we showed the impact of active defense and the risk of attack exposure, 
demonstrated the effectiveness of our methods on attack-defense behavior quantification. 
This paper filled with the gap in the quantitative assessment of defensive measures, to make 
the quantitative evaluation of attack-defense more comprehensive and accurate. 
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Introduction 
With the developing of the attack and 
defense technology, the cyber environment 
has been so sophisticated that the network 
administrators or experts cannot accurately 
evaluate the security situation of a network 
system on intuition. On the other hand, a 
wide variety of threats continually cause a 
huge damage to the governments and 
enterprises both in economy and reputation. 
A major reason for this dilemma is that the 
defenders lack a more accurate quantitative 
evaluation of attack-defense behaviors. In 
addition, the attack tricks are more and 
more sophisticated and automatic.  
In a cyber environment, the attack-
defense behaviors are a series of actions the 
adversaries and the defenders take for 
different intentions. As the adversaries and 
the defenders confront each other 
continually, the interaction between the 
attack behaviors and the defense behaviors 
is a game process. Different behavior 
choices mean the different payoffs which 
include benefits and costs, and this 
produces the attack-defense strategy that 
profiles the preference. By studying the 
interaction between attack and defense 
behaviors, the defenders are able to 
produce a reasonable optimal defense 
strategy. What's more, when the attack-
defense game is in equilibrium,  the 
corresponding payoff shows the maximum 
security risk value of the target network, and 
this value equals to the network security 
situation. Particularly, at the moment that 
the adversary choose the optimal attack 
strategy and the costs still exceed the 
benefit, the network can be regarded as safe. 
There are a lot of metrics and evaluation 
approaches that try to evaluate the security 
situation of the network both in qualitative 
and quantitative. Attack graph[1] is a typical 
work, which applies topological graph to 
analyze the security vulnerabilities and the 
interaction of nodes. It can be used to 
evaluate the cybersecurity of enterprise 
architectures[2], [3]. However, it only 
considers the vulnerabilities and the 
relationship between nodes, ignoring the 
other threats like spoofing attack and hijack 
attack, furthermore, it neglects the impact of 
defensive measures. A Bayesian network[4]–
[6] is another popular method, which is used 
to calculate the uncertainty and inherent 
uncertainty within cyber environment. For 
example, [5] applied Bayesian networks on 
attack success rate whereas [4] used it to 
describe safety risk factors in target network. 
Game theoretic evaluation approach [7]–
[9] is a comprehensive method which 
considers both the adversary and the 
defender who influenced the security 
situation. As a theory on the interaction of 
strategies made by multiple decision-
makers, game theory has been widely used 
in network security[10]–[15]. It is suitable to 
handles the interaction between attackers 
and defenders and helps the defenders 
make a more reasonable decision. 
However, despite there are a lot of related 
work evaluating network security situation 
by game theory, existing work in this area 
suffers from three key limitations, which lead 
to the inaccuracy of the evaluation. First, the 
calculation formula of payoff is 
oversimplified and impractical, therefore it 
cannot profile the utility of behaviors clearly. 
For example, previous work[16] only takes 
account of recovery capability of defense, 
the deceptive capability and the tracing 
capability do not include, so the impact of 
defense measures is inaccurate. Besides, 
proactive defense technologies such as 
cyber deception[17] come into vogue in 
network protection, the previous works, 
however, only consider the passive defense 
and the recovery capability. In fact, many 
defensive measures like cyber deception, 
intrusion detection provide two extra 
capability, which can greatly improve the 
security of the network. Thirdly, the 
increasing Advanced Persistent Threat 
events give us more thought of the length 
of attack time, the concealment and the 
scalability of attack should be considered in 
the utility of behaviors. 
This paper adopts and extends the game 
theoretic methods to evaluate the attack-
defense behaviors on different scenarios, by 
generating the optimal attack strategies, 
then calculates the maximum security risk 
value of the target network, which 
considered as the security situation of the 
network. The major contributions of this 
study are stated as follows: 
Contributions: 
1) Firstly, we distinguish the difference 
between the proactive defense and the 
passive defense in the area of utility 
calculation. 
2) Then, we subdivided the capability of 
defense measures, and we provide two 
extra capability “Deceptive Capability” 
and “Tracing Capability” to the 
evaluation of attack-defense behaviors. 
3) Last but not the least, we tentatively put 
forward a concept “attack time” in the 
evaluation of attack-defense behaviors 
and discuss how it works on the utility 
calculation. 
Model Overview 
To evaluate the attack-defense behaviors 
and relevant security situation of a target 
network, this paper summarized the 
following features of the attack-defense 
process: 
1) Attack-Defense Process is a phased 
process, and in each phase, the adversary 
and the defender are going to play a game. 
2) The attack-defense behaviors lead to 
the change of network system state. 
3) The uncertainty of attack-defense 
behaviors: Both the adversaries and the 
defenders would take more than one 
actions equally in a certain system state, so 
the adverse actions are invisible or part of 
invisible. 
4) If the adversaries exposure, they would 
be punished, so they take account of 
clearing their traces and retreating from the 
compromised computers within a certain 
time, even though they did not achieve their 
goal. 
A stochastic game, which belongs to the 
dynamic game, is a suitable model, it starts 
with an initial state, and then it would go 
through a series of state transformation 
based on both the actions taken by each 
player and the current state. 
1. Attack-Defense Stochastic 
Game Model 
Firstly, in the real cyber environment, there 
are multiple attackers and multiple 
defenders, however, this paper try to find 
the maximum security risk value of the 
target network, and multiple players have no 
effect on this, so we make a reasonable 
assumption to simplify the problem: 
Assumption 1 ： We consider multiple 
attackers as one attacker, and multiple 
defenders as one defender. 
Definition 1 ： Attack-Defense Stochastic 
Game Model (ADSGM)=｛N,S,A,D,P,U｝is a 
zero-sum Stochastic game: 
1) Participant set N=｛Attacker, Defender｝
represents the players in the game; 
2) System state space S= {S0, S1, S2 … 
SK}, ∀k ∈ Z and k ≥ 0  consists of all 
possible state of the target network 
system. In particular, we regard the 
target network as a system.  
3) Adversary actions set A= {a1, a2, a3 … 
an}, where ∅ ∈ A, and at the state k, the 
adversary actions set is A
k
; 
4) Defender actions set D= {d1, d2, d3 … 
dm}, where ∅ ∈ D, and at the state k, the 
defender actions set is D
k
; 
5) Transition probability set 
P=S×A×D×S->[0,1]; where 
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑘𝑙(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑑𝑗) ≥ 0 ∈ P  is the probability 
that under the actions 𝑎𝑖  and 𝑑𝑗 , the 
state k transfers to state l. 
6) Utility set Uk: S×A×D×S->vk, wherek =
𝑎𝑖 , 𝑑𝑗  and vk is the utility value of the 
players in the game; In addition, since 
ADSGM is a zero-sum, it means that 
the sum of the adversary utility and the 
defender utility is zero: Ua + Ub = 0; 
7) Proof of Nash equilibrium existence: 
ADSGM can be regarded as an 
extension of matrix game for each state, 
the state S, the Adversary actions A and 
Defender actions D and the utility value 
Ua and Ub are finite. As a result, ADSGM 
is a finite stochastic game and since 
Fink[18] draw a conclusion that every 
finite stochastic game exits a stable 
Nash equilibrium, ADSGM must have a 
stable Nash equilibrium.  
2. Attack-Defense scenarios 
Network intrusion process consisted of 
many distinguish stages. For each of the 
stages, the adversary achieved 
corresponding tasks, which most of the 
cases were the condition of the next task. 
The adversary adopted different attack 
technique in different stages and the 
defenders took the corresponding defensive 
measures, so the confrontation and the 
game between attack techniques and 
defense techniques distributed in different 
stages so we classified them into these 
stages to produce the strategies. We 
followed the categories of colasoft[19] in 
this paper. 
Moreover, as Table 1 shown, we divided 
the defensive measures into two categories: 
proactive defense and passive defense. It 
was mainly because that they differed in 
computing methods for the utility. 
Table1：Categories of attack and defense technologies 
Attack-defense 
Stage 
Attack techniques Passive defense Proactive defense 
Information 
collecting stage 
Information 
collection 
Gateway access 
Control Policy 、
Intrusion detection、
firewall rejection 
Mimic Defense; 
fake devices and 
services; 
Virtual topology 
Scan 
Network monitor anomaly detection; 
encrypted 
communication 
 
Intrusion stage Spoofing attack： 
IP spoofing, phishing 
email, Watering Hole 
Two-Factor 
Authentication, 
antivirus gateway, 
antivirus software 、
Network Reputation 
Database, Security 
Threat Intelligence 
Attack flow 
diversion, 
Topology 
restructuring 
DOS Anti-DOS devices 
and services, filtering 
policy 
Network traffic 
diversion 
Hijack Attack VPN, SSL Gateway, 
DNS protection 
 
Vulnerability 
Exploitation 
Intrusion Detection 
System, Firewall 
system, vulnerability 
scanning services, 
patch management 
system 
Honey-patches 
Malware and 
malicious code 
log analysis, Sandbox 
dynamic detection, 
honeypot 
 
Password attack Limited login, 
intensive password 
policy, uniform 
identity 
authentication, 
digital certificate, 
weak password scan 
Uvauth 
Privilege elevation 
stage 
Vulnerability 
Exploitation 
Intrusion Detection 
System, Firewall 
Honey-patches  
system, vulnerability 
scanning services, 
patch management 
system 
Lateral transfer 
stage 
Intranet reflection 
Attack, Domain 
penetration, host 
penetration 
Intranet access 
Control, client 
security detection 
 
Certificate theft, 
Bypass the hash 
Honeywords 
Persistent resident 
stage 
backdoor Antivirus software, 
gateway flow analysis 
 
Tracks eraser stage erasing invasion, 
Ransomware 
network audit 
system, network 
traffic analysis, attack 
source traceback  
 
3. Attack-Defense State Transition 
of a stochastic game  
  This paper converted the stochastic game 
state transition (which means the state 
transition of the network system) as the state 
transition of each node in the target network. 
Since a state transition of a node usually 
means that the other nodes are going to 
face new security threats such as the 
watering hole, hijack attack and so on, and 
consequently the network system security 
situation may have changed accordingly. So 
essentially, the system state transition was 
owing to the state transitions of each node 
and this equivalent conversion was 
reasonable. 
  In ADSGM, the attack-defense state 
transition can be modeled as a directed 
graph G=(S, E), in which S represents the 
game state set and E describe the transition 
of state.  
 
Fig1. Example of ADSGM’s state 
  According to fig.1, the system state space 
is S = {S1, S2, S3} and the 𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑑𝑗) 
represents the possibility from current state 
to the next state while the adversary and the 
defender take the actions 𝑎𝑖  and 𝑑𝑗 
respectively, since not all of the states can 
transfer certainly to each other, and some 
transition between the nodes can be 
impossible. 
  In addition, for each node, the possible 
attack-defense actions according to table 1 
determined the type of state the node 
include, and we conclude four types of state 
for node: a) no privilege; b) remote access 
privilege; c) root privilege; d) data leak state. 
Moreover, despite a node could have many 
types of state, but the adversary tends to let 
the node into a more dangerous state to 
obtain maximum payoff, so this paper 
produced the system state set by a greedy 
generation algorithm, which chose the most 
dangerous state of all possible state by a 
heuristic method. An equally important 
reason we found was that as the number of 
states for the node grew, the complexity of 
ADSGM increased exponentially, so we give 
the greedy algorithm:  
Algorithm 1. System State Generation 
Greedy Algorithm 
INPUT：  Network topology graph 
 G = {N, E}, 𝑁𝑖 = {𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 , 𝐴
𝑁𝑖 , 𝐷𝑁𝑖 , 𝑆𝑁𝑗} 
OUTPUT：Target system state set: S 
1. Find all entrance node in N  and 
label as 𝐸𝑖 in Entrance[]; 
2. For 𝐸𝑖 in Entrance[ ]: 
3.  Initialize 𝑆0,N[ ], S[ ] 
4.  S[ ]<—𝑆0; 
5.  N[ ]<—𝐸𝑖 ; 
6.  For 𝑁𝑖 in N[ ]: 
7.    each 𝑁𝑗   in 𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟[ ]: 
8.    Generate all possible actions set 
𝐴𝑁𝑗 and corresponding utility 
9.    Choose the maximum utility 
action and corresponding state 𝑆𝑁𝑗; 
10.    S[ ]<—𝑆𝑁𝑗; 
11.    N[ ]<—𝑁𝑗 ; 
12.  End for 
13. End for 
4. Utilities of actions in ADSGM 
  In ADSGM, the attack-defense actions 
described the attack-defense behaviors, 
and in the rest of this article, we use both 
of them indiscriminately. 
The attack-defense utility profiled the 
expectation of an action the adversary and 
the defender took, and it determined the 
generation of strategies. Regarding the 
evolution of attack-defense behaviors as a 
game of the adversary and the defender, 
and at the principle that both the adversary 
and the defender were rational, then we 
calculated the maximum payoff of all 
strategies to regard as security situation of 
the network. 
-Adversary knowledge and utility 
Following the previous researches[7], [16], 
this paper divided the utility of an attack 
behavior into two part: one part was the 
benefit of the attack behavior, it came from 
the damage the system suffered, and the 
other one was the costs of the attack 
behavior, so the attack utility formula was 
as follow: 
Definition 2: The attacker utility functions 
were: 
𝑈𝑎 = 𝐵𝑎 − 𝐶𝑎                                        (1) 
Where Ba represented the benefit of the 
attack behavior and Ca was the cost of the 
attack behavior. 
  Furthermore, this paper subdivided the 
cost part into two type:  
a) The cost of the resource, for example, 
the computing resource and network 
resource; 
b) The risk of exposure refer to the risk of 
exposing the adversaries themselves. 
We found that the second part of costs is the 
major factor that influences the decision of 
adversaries, so simplified the problem that 
the risk of exposure equaled the total cost of 
the attack action. In the next section, we 
demonstrated how it affected the strategies 
and the result of a game. 
- Defensive measures and utility 
  In a real network system, the 
administrator arranges a variety of defensive 
measurement to hinder the attack behaviors, 
and consequently prevent the achievement 
of the adversary goal, and the degree of 
system security depends on the intention of 
attack the system can resist, so it is 
important to measure this ability. 
In the previous section, we discussed the 
attack-defense scenarios and divided the 
defensive measures into two categories. The 
basis of categories were not only the 
different mechanisms they possessed, more 
importantly, but also we found that they 
provided different defensive abilities. 
Traditional passive defensive measures such 
as firewall, patch management provided the 
“Recovery Capability”, in contrast, proactive 
defensive measures like cyber deception 
tried to conceal the target network, create 
uncertainty and confusion against the 
adversary's efforts to establish situational 
awareness and to influence and misdirect 
adversary perceptions and decision 
processes. This paper characterized this 
ability as “Deceptive Capability”. 
Finally, there was another ability called 
“Tracing Capability”, which often was 
ignored by evaluation tools. Actually, it was 
an implicit factor influenced the evolution of 
attack-defense behaviors, since it related to 
the cost of attack actions. Higher tracing 
capability brought a higher risk of exposure, 
and we try to use a metric called “average 
attack time” to weight the balance between 
them. 
-Average attack time and utility 
  In order to evaluate the risk of exposure 
for the adversary and the tracing capability 
of the target system, we tentatively 
introduced the concept of the attack time 
and average attack time to calculate the 
effect of them on utility. Firstly we give the 
definition of the attack time and the average 
attack time: 
Definition 3：Attack time was the length of 
time that the adversary launched a specific 
attack until they finished. 
Definition 4: Average attack time was the 
average duration of a specific attack for 
most adversaries. 
  The attack time describe the  For our 
evaluation, the average attack time is an 
empirical constants, 
This paper explained how these three 
capabilities worked on the utility calculation 
and the evaluation of the network security 
situation. To begin with, we put forward 
three attributes to signify the capability of 
each defensive measures, and introduced 
the calculation methods: 
Recovery Capability (R)： 
R was corresponding to the loss the 
system suffered by an attack action, and the 
recovery capability can mitigate this loss, so 
we weighted the mitigation by the formula: 
L′ = L − R                   (2) 
Deceptive Capability (E): 
  The effect on increasing network security 
was that it created uncertainty of attack 
actions, so despite the damage of the attack 
action was fixed, it could mitigate the 
damage that the system or device suffered 
by this action. According to this, we 
calculated this capability by a payoff matrix: 
𝑈𝑓
′ = 𝑃(𝑓|𝜑, 𝑓)𝑈𝑓 =
𝜑𝑓,?̃?
𝑁?̃?
𝑈𝑓       (3) 
Where 𝑓  presented the true fingerprint 
whereas 𝑓  presented the observation 
fingerprint, 𝑁?̃? was the total number of the 
devices in the system whose observation 
fingerprint was 𝑓 and 𝜑𝑓,?̃? was the defense 
configuration describing the number of the 
true fingerprint(𝑓)which observed as 𝑓. 
Tracing Capability (T): 
  The tracing capability described the 
capability of discovering the attack actions, 
and this paper formalized it as a time-
related function: 
   𝑇(𝑡) = 𝛼 ∗ 𝑇 𝑡⁄                (4) 
Whereαis empirical coefficient and T is a 
constant represent “Attack time” of a certain 
attack action.  
  Then we extended the utility calculation 
formula based on (1), (2) and (4). 
Definition 4: The adversary utility functions 
were: 
𝑈𝑎,𝑑 = (𝐿 − 𝑅) ∗ 𝑉 − 𝑇(𝑡) 
            = (𝐿 − 𝑅) ∗ 𝑉 − 𝛼𝑇 𝑡⁄  (5) 
V represented the asset value and L can be 
divided into C for confidentiality, I for 
integrity and A for availability. 
-Calculating the payoff matrix 
ADSGM was a zero-sum game, and we 
regarded it as a matrix game with a Markov 
decision process[20], there was an example 
of a matrix game at state 𝑆𝑘: 
Table2：Example of a payoff matrix 
𝑆𝑘  a1 a2 a3 
𝑑1 𝑠𝑎1,𝑑1
𝑘
 𝑠𝑎2,𝑑1
𝑘  𝑠𝑎3,𝑑1
𝑘  
𝑑2 𝑠𝑎1,𝑑𝑗
𝑘  𝑠𝑎2,𝑑2
𝑘  𝑠𝑎3,𝑑2
𝑘  
∅ 𝑠𝑎1,𝑑𝑗
𝑘
 𝑠𝑎2,𝑑3
𝑘  𝑠𝑎3,𝑑3
𝑘  
Each column of the table corresponding 
to the possible attack actions and each row 
shows the possible defense actions. The 
element 𝑠𝑎𝑖,𝑑𝑗
𝑘  represented the payoff of 
the adversary, and the payoff of defenders 
was −𝑠𝑎𝑖,𝑑𝑗
𝑘  because of the zero-sum game. 
In ADSGM, the payoff matrix elements 
were as follow: 
𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑘 = 𝑢𝑖𝑗
𝑘 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑘𝑙(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑒𝑑𝑗)𝑠𝑙
k
l=1
 [20]    (6) 
Where  𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑘𝑙(𝑎𝑖, 𝑑𝑗)≥0 was the transition 
probability from state k to state l. 𝑢𝑖𝑗
𝑘  was 
the utility of adversary utility, 
∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑘𝑙(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑑𝑗)𝑠𝑙
k
l=1
 represented the indirect 
benefits, and the value of the game was: 
𝑣𝑘 = 𝑉𝑎𝑙(𝑆𝑘)                     (7) 
Solving ADSGM Algorithm 
This paper followed the previous study[20] 
using Shapley iterative algorithm to solve 
formula (6), and the existence theorem of 
game value has been given which would not 
be repeated here. Now giving the algorithm: 
Algorithm 1. Attack-Defense Stochastic 
Game Algorithm 
INPUT： ADSGM =｛N,S,A,D,P,U｝and δ 
OUTPUT： Optimal attack and defense 
strategies. 
1. Initialize v
0
=( v
0
(1), v
0
(2), ···, v0(K)); 
2. Repeat 
3.   For each SkϵS do 
4.   For all 𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑘  do 
5.    Replace 𝑠𝑙 in (7) as 𝑣𝑙; 
6.   end for 
7.    Calculate 𝑣𝑘
𝑟+1 = 𝑉𝑎𝑙(𝑢𝑖𝑗
𝑘 +
∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑘𝑙(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑑𝑗)𝑣𝑙
𝑟
k
l=1
); 
8.   end for 
9.   for eachSkϵS do 
10.     𝑣𝑘 ← 𝑉𝑎𝑙(Sk); 
11.   end for 
12. until|𝑣𝑘
𝑟+1 − 𝑣𝑘
𝑟| < 𝛿,∀ SkϵS 
13. for eachSkϵS do 
14.   (𝜋𝑎
𝑘, 𝜋𝑑
𝑘) = 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒(Sk); 
15. end for 
16. return (𝜋𝑎
𝑘, 𝜋𝑑
𝑘). 
 
Case study 
First, this paper supposed that there was 
a typical network system topology as fig2. 
The adversary could access client A and B by 
the Internet, and there was a firewall 
between the Internet and the intranet. The 
access rules of the firewall were as table 2 
listed. In particular, the shadow asset was 
the “copy” of the key asset and it 
misdirected adversary perceptions and 
decision processes. 
Firewall
Client B
Client A
Server A
Shadow asset
Key asset
Server B
Adversary
 
Fig.2 Topology of the example network 
Table2: Access Control Rules of Firewall 
From To Access Control 
All Server B Allow 
Client B Server A Allow 
Client A Client B Allow 
Server B key asset Allow 
Server B Shadow asset Allow 
  Then, this paper listed all possible attack 
and defense actions on the target network 
based on Table1: 
Table3: Adversary Actions List 
A describe 
a1 weak password attack 
a2 CVE 
a3 DOS 
a4 CVE 
a5 malicious code 
a6 phishing email 
a7 Bypass the hash 
a8 CVE 
Table4: Defender Actions List 
D describe 
d1 Limited login 
d2 anti-virus software 
d3 Patch manager system 
d4 firewall 
d5 Ø 
Besides, this paper supposed the adversary 
actions sets and defense configuration were 
as follow: 
Table5: Adversary actions and defense 
configuration of each node 
Node Action set Attack effect 
Client A a2 root 
a3 
a6 
no privilege 
user 
Client B a1 
a3 
a4 
user 
no privilege 
user 
Server A a2, d3 
a5,d2 
user 
user 
Server B a1 ,d1 
a6, d4 
root 
user 
Key Asset a7 user 
Shadow 
Asset 
a7 user 
Now, we assumed that the adversary had 
compromised client A, and recognized client 
A as an entrance node, then generated the 
system state set by Algorithm 1 and output 
the directed graph fig.3.  
Fig.3 Attack-defense stochastic game state 
graph 
S0 was the system state that client A had 
been compromised, the adversary actions 
set was A
0
= {a1, a2, a3, a4} and the defender 
actions set D
0
= {d1, d5}, where especially, d5 
is Ø 
S0 d1 d5(Ø) 
S1:  a1 (60-40)*1-0+∑s1=30 70*1 
a2 (80-0)*0.5-0+∑s1=30 90*1 
S’1:  a3 30*1-5+∑s’1=25 25 
S2:  a4 (40-0)*0.1-
10+∑s2=20 
20 
so the(𝜋𝑎
0, 𝜋𝑑
0) = (0.5,0.5,0,0), then turn to 
S1 and continue until no more state. 
  Now we concentrate on state S2, 
according to the passive measure “Shadow 
asset” on node 5 which identified node 6, 
and the adversary actions set A
2
 ={a7,a8} and 
the defender actions set D
2
={d3,d5}, then 
give the original payoff matrix: 
S2 d8 d5(Ø) 
S4:  a7 (100-0)*10-100=900 900 
a8 (100-40)*10-100=500 900 
S5:  a7 (100-0)*0-100=-100 -100 
 a8 (100-0)*0-100=-100 -100 
after we using formula (6), then the payoff 
matrix will be as follow: 
S2 d8 d5(Ø) 
S4:  a7 (900-100)/2=400 400 
a8 (500-100)/2=200 200 
S5:  a7 -100 -100 
 a8 -100 -100 
It is obvious that the passive defense 
measure reduces the utility of attack actions 
and increase the security of the target 
system. 
Finally get the accumulated payoff of the 
adversary, which is a negative correlation to 
the system security situation. 
Related Work 
Network security assessment is an 
essential problem which researchers and 
businesses have been always concerned 
about, and many excellent studies has been 
proposed to solve this problem such as [2]–
[4], [21]–[24], [2], [3] using attack-graph to 
analysis the risk assessment, whereas some 
other studies[4], [21]–[24] examine the 
matter from different angles. For example, 
[21] use D-S theory to analyze the risk of 
information security, [4] try to solve the 
same problem with a  probabilistic model, 
whereas [22] propose a new method to 
measure the impact of the attack mission 
and develop a tool based on it. what's more, 
[24] propose a new model to estimate the 
time to compromise a system component 
that is visible to an attacker.  
In addition, game theory for security has 
been studied extensively based on a variety 
of game model, and many of them [18], 
[25]–[27] try to using the stochastic game to 
solve a series of security problem which 
gives us much inspiration. Particularly, [18] 
give the proof of the equilibrium extension 
in a stochastic n-person game. Besides, the 
game theory is adept at the evaluation of 
attack-defense behaviors[10], [26], [28], [29] 
and the defense resource allocation[30], [31]. 
What’s more, the researches on estimating 
the attack-defense behaviors in a system-
level propose a new angle to estimate the 
system security degree[7], [8], [16], [20], [30]. 
[20] proposed an feasibility framework to 
model the interactions of attack-defense 
behavior and system state, however the 
effect of defense still have not discussed 
clearly, which may lead to a fault in  
prediction and evaluation of attack-defense 
behaviors and [16] take the cost of behavior 
into account of the utility calculation and 
refer to the recovery capability of defensive 
measures. However, neither of them discuss 
the passive defense and the effect of it on 
the attack-defense interactions. 
Furthermore, researches like[32], [32], [33] 
has shown the effective and important of 
deception and [34] introduce a novel game-
theoretic model of deceptive interactions of 
the adversary and the defender which 
inspire this paper handling the passive 
defense effects on the system security 
assessment. However, they are 
concentrated on generating and optimizing 
the algorithm of deception strategy. 
Whereas this paper is more concerned 
about the influence of deception on the 
utility and payoff functions. 
Discussion 
This paper used an attack-defense 
stochastic game model to evaluate the 
attack-defense behaviors and the security 
situation of the target system. Furthermore, 
previous studies rarely considered proactive 
defensive measures that can substantially 
influence the attack-defense behaviors and 
the system situation, whereas this paper 
tentatively put forward a more reasonable 
scheme, which distinguished the different 
ability of proactive defense measure and 
passive defense measure and evaluated the 
utility of them in different ways. In addition, 
this paper tried to use “attack time” to 
measure the risk of exposure of adversary 
and the ability of the defender to discover 
the attack behaviors. 
Compare with the previous work, the 
most contribution of this paper was 
considering the passive measures into 
account and subdivided the capability of 
defense measures, and consequently 
increased the accuracy of the system 
security evaluation. 
However, it should note that this study 
has examined only the feasibility of ADSGM, 
more examination will be conducted on 
both the utility and on more complex and 
larger target system in the future. 
Summary 
To sum up, first of all, 1) this paper studied 
the influence of defensive measures on an 
attack-defense game and take two extra 
capability of defensive measures into 
account of the evaluation of system security 
situation. In addition, 2) we put forward a 
method on proactive defense utility 
calculation and we take a case study to 
illustrate how it works and how important it 
is. Finally, 3) we tentatively put forward an 
idea of “attack time” which may be a helpful 
metric to measure the ability of attack 
detection and the attacker ability. 
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